

to answer them now that they have escaped into a public session, I shall not press them. I have little doubt that they could have been answered in private session, as they are already within the limits I have prescribed of being certainly known to foreign Powers.

I had intended to open to-day with a statement of the strength of the armed forces of the Soviet Government. But yesterday, in what seemed to me the most impressive part of his speech, the Minister of Defence gave us the figures on which the Government rely. There was, he said, 175 active divisions. This, I presume, is a part of the much larger number, nearly double, which could be produced in a few months. Even if only half of the 175 were used against us in western Europe, they could therefore launch over 80 divisions upon us without any further mobilization.

The Minister of Defence also stated that one-third of these 175 divisions are mechanized or armoured. That is a tremendous statement. I see that Mr. Vincent, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives at Washington, quoted the total Russian tank strength at 40,000, or seven times that of the United States. Our figure of 6,000, therefore, given yesterday by the Minister of Defence, is comparable, I take it, with this estimate of 40,000. But even more important than the reserves or general stock of tanks is the number organized in formations. Could we be told, since so much has been disclosed, of the number of Soviet tanks now assembled on or near the western front in formations? Would 4,000 or 5,000 tanks in organized formations be an excessive estimate?

"ARMoured AVALANCHES"

In Korea we have seen how formidable even a few score of tanks can be and how tough the Russian tanks are. Any development and improvement in bazooka and other anti-tank weapons would be greatly welcomed. I do not know how well the Western Union forces are equipped with the latest and largest patterns, but I cannot think that the threat of the enormous mass of the Soviet armour is in any way mastered or that there is anything in use and service at the present time which could cope with the array of armoured avalanches we must expect on the outbreak of war, should war occur.

Let us see what the Western Union can put against all this. M. Reynaud last week said that we and our European allies have in western Germany two British divisions, two American, and three French. For the rest, he said the French have four divisions in Europe and I think the Belgians one—a total of 12. I should think that M. Reynaud is tolerably well informed upon these matters.

On this assumption, Western Union would have 12 divisions, against more than 80, and of which less than two are armoured, against anything from 25 to 30. The Russians know their own strength, but it is certain that they also know with great precision the allied weakness and condition. Are the odds in ground troops on the western front eight or nine to one against us, or are they four, five, or six, or seven to one? Or is there no truth in this figure at all and are things much better?

DEFENCE OF WESTERN GERMANY

When, in March, I said that it would be necessary and right to enable the Germans of western Germany to take part in the defence of their hearths and homes from the hideous menace under which they lie, the Prime Minister dismissed my advice as irresponsible. However, it is the advice which I understand the military commanders of the United States, at any rate would give. At present, we have followed the principle that the only Germans who may be rearmed are the Communist Germans in the eastern zone, who have been formed by the Soviets into a highly effective police army with powerful weapons and numbering 45,000 or 50,000 men—it may be more—and with considerable offshoots in the Communist cells and caches of arms known to exist in western Germany. I do not wonder that something like panic prevails along the eastern frontier of western Germany. Every true German friend of reconciliation with the western democratic world and the redemption of their past by faithful service knows that the lurking Communist in the neighbourhood has marked him down for early liquidation. How can there be any foundation for a helpful German policy under such conditions?

Referring to the satellite Powers, Mr. Churchill said that Poland, under strict Russian control, with a Russian marshal at the head of her forces, had a powerful party army. Czechoslovakia had another army,

Minister stated them on Monday as 10,000 men and 180 planes in three bomber groups. To this the Minister of Defence added last night that there were also fighter squadrons. So we may be sure the Russians know the main facts pretty well. It is on this foundation the Communists base their oft-repeated charge that Britain is an aircraft carrier to attack the Soviet Union. It is also our major defence against the consequences which would follow the Russian onslaught in Europe, and it is a vital part of the atomic bomb deterrent which is what we are living on now.

More than two years have passed since this base was established and became public. It was obvious, whatever else was done or not done, that from that moment the utmost endeavours should have been used to make it secure by every form of anti-aircraft artillery, with every development of radar, and by the largest number of the latest type of aircraft we could produce or get from the United States. But one fact makes me anxious. I simply cannot comprehend a policy which on the one hand takes this extraordinary risk of establishing this base and yet disperses or distributes so large a proportion of the jet aircraft production in which British genius has held the lead. We wonder how many we have distributed to our friends or sold to foreign countries. I would remind the House that 100 jets were sold to Argentina, which lays claims to the Falkland Islands; 100 were sold or traded to Egypt, of all countries, which was actually blocking the canal in violation of the treaty. Here are 210 machines, only, of course, a proportion of those dispersed, within the total of those invaluable jets, and of those 210 we have been deprived by an act of improvidence without description or repair. (Opposition cheers.)

"WE ARE OUTNUMBERED"

The Auxiliary Air Force of 20 squadrons, a main element in our defences, manned by very high quality volunteers, is really worthy of the finest weapon our factories can make. This force could have been rearmed by now with the jets we have distributed to foreign countries. I simply cannot understand it. In the 50 years since I entered this House I have never seen anything quite like it. I made my protests and appeals to the Prime Minister more than a year ago. Perhaps we can now be told that at least the sale of our jets to neutrals has now been stopped. In relative strength of armoured and armoured forces we are, I believe, outnumbered as we have never been before.

Turning to the Navy, Mr. Churchill said that reliable reference books estimated the present Russian U-boat fleet at 360, divided no doubt between the Pacific and the west, of which between 100 and 200 were ocean-going and capable of high speeds. He was not accepting those very large figures as final, but what was the truth about them? Many of these U-boats were of 20 knots. A modern 20-knot submarine U-boat would, it was calculated, be able to search five times the area of water covered by the last war U-boats, with their maximum submerged speed of nine knots. He did not know our resources in up-to-date anti-U-boat craft, but he doubted very much whether they were in numbers equal, actually, or still less proportionately, to what those who were called the "guilty men" of the last war had prepared. It was probably true to say that the Russian U-boat menace to our trans-ocean lifeline and world communications, covering all American reinforcements for Europe, would be far more severe than were the German U-boat attacks in 1939 and 1940; and they seemed quite enough then. We had, however, Air Force Coastal Command, and in that and in multiplication of aircraft carriers and anti-submarine vessels lay our hope and, he trusted, our policy.

THE ATOMIC BOMB

U.S. SUPERIORITY

Fortunately (continued) there is a fourth vast sphere of defence, in which the United States has enormous and measureless superiority. Two years ago I said at Llandudno: "Nothing stands between Europe to-day and complete subjugation to Communist tyranny but the atomic bomb in American possession."

I understand we have no atomic bombs of our own. We were far forward in this matter in the war. We could not ourselves undertake it, because we were under fire—that was the only reason why we did not—but we earnestly pressed the Americans into it, as my conversations with President Roosevelt in 1942 will

Navy would repel invasion until eventually a vast air power was developed here which would bring us out of our troubles even if left alone. Now I cannot feel the same sense of concrete assurance.

We must never despair. We must never give in. We have 3m men and women who did service in the armed forces in the last war; we have 750,000 who have been trained since, and there are nearly 700,000 in the armed forces; and many thousands in the voluntary and auxiliary forces. Our industrial capacity and that of the free world is gigantic. Our scientific and technical ability is unsurpassed. We may well have time in which to organize the mighty latent strength of Britain, surrounded by the Commonwealth.

WARNING OF GREAT DANGERS

But I warn the House that we have as great dangers to face in 1950 and 1951 as we had 10 years ago, and here we are with deep and continuing differences between us in our domestic spheres, and faced with dangers and problems which all our united strength can scarcely overcome. It was this that led me to hope that in private session the sense of the corporate life of the House of Commons might have asserted itself. But that has been forbidden by the Prime Minister. (Cries of "By the House!") It has been forbidden by the Prime Minister, and at his request the House is prevented from meeting together and talking matters over in secret.

It is with deep grief that I have to say these things, and to reflect that it is only five years ago, almost to the month, that we were victorious, respected, and safe. Of course, the whole burden does not rest on this country, nor on the Government of this country; they have done several important things, like the establishment of compulsory national service and the East Anglian American bases; they have fostered the closest relations with the United States, and our European friends; and have maintained an active resistance to Communism in its various forms. Nevertheless I say that they bear a fearful accountability. The Prime Minister has already had power, men, and money never enjoyed by any Government before in time of peace. If they had asked for more Parliament would have granted it to them, and we would have given it our full support. (Cheers.)

It was with a sense of relief that I felt entitled to say in March that we should accept no responsibility for the present state of our defences. (Opposition cheers.) That does not mean that we will not strive to help the Government, in spite of their total lack of consideration for our wishes and point of view, in every measure, however unpopular, which they may propose and which we recognize is aimed solely at securing national survival. (Loud and prolonged cheers.)

Atomic Bomb Is Not the Weapon

*Its Use in Korea Would Alienate Friends of U. S. in the Orient:
Lack of Proper Targets Would Make It Ineffective Militarily*

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The United States reverses in Korea and the atrocities committed by North Korean troops and Communist execution squads already have evoked demands—still fortunately few—that we should use the atomic bomb against Northern Korea.

A few private citizens, and one or two members of Congress more noted for their vehemence than their sagacity, have urged the employment of this terrible weapon, apparently on the assumption that it would revenge our slaughtered soldiers and turn the tide of war to our advantage in Korea. With the Kum River line breached, and with our troops still in retreat these demands are likely to continue. And if we fight a last-ditch, back-to-the-wall action for the port of Pusan, as we may well be forced to do, this counsel of desperation may reach its crescendo.

This is unfortunately always true in war. As the going becomes tough, expediency replaces ethics. But those who urge the use of the atomic bomb are the voice of doom. Under no circumstances should the atomic bomb be used in Korea. Our whole aim should be to avoid an atomic strategy, if possible, in any war.

Compelling Reasons

There are overpowering moral, political, psychological and military reasons against the employment of the atomic bomb in the "little hot war" which is constantly growing bigger in Korea.

The moral arguments against such use are self evident: "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"

The political and psychological reasons for a policy of atomic abstention should also be self-evident. Politically, an atomic strategy would tend to spread what already has far exceeded the limits of a "police action. Use of the atomic bomb against Northern Korea might well extend the war to the world.

Psychologically, the use of the atomic bomb would be almost certain to consolidate North Korea and most of Asia, even those few peoples of Asia who are still our friends, against us. The Commu-

nist-sponsored "World Peace Appeal," which has been collecting signatures in this country as well as throughout the world to a petition seeking to outlaw atomic warfare, already is making capital out of the irresponsible utterances of the few who have advocated the use of the atomic bomb against Korea.

A mobilization of world public opinion to brand the United States as the war-mongering aggressive power, and to indict us as the authors of war unlimited already has made too much progress, partly because of the past undue emphasis our military leaders have put upon the atomic bomb as the Maginot Line of our defense. If we want to lose what friends and what influence we have left in Asia, a good way to do it is to drop the atomic bomb on North Korea.

The military reasons against any such atomic bombardment are even more convincing. First, we have few atomic bombs—so few that if even if their use were justified the most careful possible consideration must be given to the strategic importance of the proposed targets. In other words, we do not have enough atomic bombs even to bomb the most important objectives in Russia—much less elsewhere in the world.

Second, the atomic bomb is a weapon that is primarily useful against area targets—cities or great industrial (including oil) facilities, large and vital communications centers, or possibly, but less likely, heavy troop, aircraft or shipping concentrations (as in an amphibious landing). There are no such targets in Northern Korea. It is, of course, true, that Northern Korea is the industrialized part of the country, and there are five different areas which have some industrial importance—Pyongyang, the northern capital; Sinuiju, Wonsan, Hungnam and Changjin.

There is a steel mill, once part of the Japanese Mitsubishi empire, near Pyongyang, with an estimated capacity of 180,000 tons annually; there is a former Japanese aircraft factory and a coal mine in the same area. At Wonsan there are important railroad repair shops and an oil refinery, and there are other industrial, communication and power facilities in North Korea, the destruction of

which might well hamper in time the conduct of a war.

But none of these are of sufficient size or importance to warrant the use of an atomic bomb, and in any case the evidence so far available from the Korean fighting is that the weapons and equipment used by the aggressors are part of accumulated stockpiles manufactured in some other area than Korea. There is today no target in Northern Korea that would militarily warrant the use of an atomic bomb against it.

Use Is Not Effective

Perhaps the fundamental military reason why the atomic bomb should not—and will not—be used in the Korean fighting is that its use would not be effective. Those who advocate its use apparently do so on the assumption that one or two atomic bombs would force the Northern Korean Communists to stop fighting. There is no evidence to support this theory; in fact the odds are against it.

The only type of bombing that interrupts communications and halts or severely hampers ground armies is continuous round-the-clock tactical bombing, with low-flying planes—light-bombers, bombers and fighter-bombers—against roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, freight yards, repair shops, tanks, trucks, troops, etc.

This can be supplemented by the use of bombers like our B-29's using conventional bombs, which are powerful enough for Korean targets, against large communications junctions and some of the railroad repair shops and power stations of North Korea. All this means a large number of planes intensively used; it means conventional bombs of various types; rockets and napalm [jellied gasoline]; but it does not mean the need for, or the desirability of, the atomic bomb.

There is another point, which those few Americans who so carelessly advocate the use of the atomic bomb should remember. We no longer have an atomic monopoly. The best estimates, open, of course, to much doubt, are that Russia now has between five and twenty atomic bombs. And our lagging civil defense plans are just beginning to move like the ~~hail~~ and the blind.

SOVIET SHORTAGES IN ARMS RACE CITED

Mobilization Class Is Told of Advances and the Need for U. S. Preparedness

By JOHN STUART

In one of the most completely rounded estimates of Soviet war potential yet made public, Comdr. William T. Greenhalgh of the United States Navy declared yesterday that Russia's power by no means was insuperable. He said this was true even if we accepted an unofficial estimate that the Soviet Union now had some forty atomic bombs and could produce more at the rate of twenty-five a year.

Commander Greenhalgh, a member of the faculty of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, declared that if the United States "relaxes not a minute" in its own industrial progress Russian leaders would consider armed aggression so obviously unprofitable that they would not venture it. The commander spoke for two hours before 300 industrial executives and reserve officers attending the economic mobilization course being conducted by the Industrial College at the Astor Hotel.

He granted Russian superiority in natural resources and manpower but termed the Soviet government itself one of that country's great weaknesses.

"It is a vast beauraucracy," Commander Greenhalgh said, "bound up in red tape that kills initiative of all sorts. It begets fears and jealousies and internal dissensions. This, taken with Russia's failure to control its satellites, might yet lead to a collapse before the country is otherwise ready for an adventure in arms."

While Russia's present striking

SEES RUSSIA DETERRED



Comdr. William T. Greenhalgh

force, by land, sea and air, was believed to be high, he declared that its industrial capacity had only reached pre-war level; this is not enough to maintain an armed effort, he said, and lack of roads and railroads would make mobilization difficult and supply more so.

He described most of Russia's progress as "stolen." Had it not been for information obtained from Prof. Klaus Fuchs and others, he said, Russia would not now have any atomic bombs. He denounced the activities here of Amtorg, the Russian trading agency, which, he said, had copied blueprints that were furnished to it in connection with bids, and had placed orders for single items on promises of

"big contracts." Both plans and items immediately were sent to Russia to develop the products at home, he charged.

In this connection he said that the Washington police had the names of 20,000 card carriers in the Communist party in the District of Columbia. On the other hand, he said, the military authorities have records of about 14,000 Russians, including six Red generals, who have deserted to the West since the war.

"Up to the limits of the German conquest," he said, "we knew Russia and its potentials and their distribution pretty well. Beyond that we knew little. But the information keeps trickling in, and it's getting better and better."

The Commander said that within the last twenty years the average temperature of Russia's most productive region in the south had risen by six degrees. The result has been that rivers and streams have dried up or have been lowered so that a vast program of canalization and irrigation has been necessary.

Labor a Major Problem

Despite the enormous growth of Soviet population, which Commander Greenhalgh said should reach 250,000,000 by 1970, he declared the peasant, reluctant to leave the better living conditions on the farms, had had to be drafted for industrial work in the cities. So heavy have been the drafts, he said, that the farms already are suffering from manpower shortages in supplying adequate food for the cities.

Those who protest against the labor draft, he said, land in the forced labor camps; he estimated the population of these camps at eighteen to twenty million persons.

Despite the Soviet Union's vast resources in coal and iron, the commander described her oil resources as still doubtful. Her best aviation gas, he said, is only 91 octane.

Russia has the world's biggest manganese deposits, he pointed out, but is deficient in copper, lead and molybdenum. Similarly, she

has been trying desperately to stock-pile natural rubber, cotton and wool from Malaya, Brazil and Australia. She already is the second largest producer of synthetic rubber.

"Despite all this," he said, "Russia is the only country in the world whose heavy industry exceeds its light industry in size—and that means armaments. And, starting from scratch as she did after the war, there is no doubt that her armament industry is the best dispersed in the world. Her production in armaments is now bigger than at the peak of the war, when she had to get so much from Great Britain and ourselves."

Commander Greenhalgh quoted Stalin on modern aircraft as having said "if you can see them, they're obsolete," and admitted that in actual operative aircraft Russia was first with 19,000 on the line and a war production capacity of 60,000 a year. Of her 10,000 fighters, he said that half were jets. But he estimated that she had only 400 long-range bombers comparable to our B-29's, while we had over 2,500 and were going into production of such better long-range planes as the B-36 and B-50.

Submarine Ability Discounted

Admitting that Stalin now had a bigger submarine fleet than Hitler had—about 300—he discounted the Russian vessels' ability as compared with our latest snorkel types.

Lack of mobility he described as the chief weakness of Russian power. He pointed out that with three times our area, she has but one third of our railway mileage. He said the rolling stock was small, obsolete and slow.

Along with this was an almost complete lack of roads and a production of motor vehicles amounting last year to only 250,000 trucks and cars of such poor quality that they needed complete overhaul every 10,000 miles. Of her existent motor fleet of 1,300,000, he said the vast majority was parked, awaiting spare parts that were not being produced. Yet, he said, Russia has 40,000 tanks, against our 7,000.

though less trustworthy, and the arsenals of Skoda, possibly the largest arms plant now in Europe, were steadily pouring out their weapons. If the facts he had stated could not be contradicted by the Government, the preparations of the Western Union to defend itself certainly stood on a far lower level than those of the South Koreans.

THREAT ACROSS THE CHANNEL.

We may, no doubt, throw much of the blame on France and the Benelux countries, weakened by the disasters of the war, but do not let us imagine that we are not in danger ourselves (continued Mr. Churchill). If, as Mr. Reynaud says, and I have no reason to dispute him, the Soviet armies, with their armoured columns, could be at Calais and reach the Channel—or the Atlantic, that is to say—before any substantial reinforcements from the United States could arrive upon the scene—if that is true, then we ourselves, although protected from an immediate incursion by the anti-tank obstacle of the Channel, with its waves, tides, and storms, will be subjected to a bombardment by rocket-propelled and guided missiles—I am not speaking of atomic bombs—incomparably more severe than anything we have endured or imagined.

The Soviet Government picked up and developed all the Germans knew about this form of war. Peenemuende fell into their hands, and all the German secrets of this new phase of warfare, on which Hitler had set his final hopes, has been developed in five years of intensive study and production.

The Russians do not need to come to the coast to plant their batteries. Very long ranges are within the compass of these weapons, and they can pick and choose their places. If we were alone, I might give some indication of the inconvenience which might be caused thereby. All this is true and may be near—how near no one knows for certain, except the dictator oligarchy in the Kremlin, who accept no moral principles as known to us, but who are able to pursue year after year their calculated plans for world conquest.

"IMMENSE" AIR FORCES.

Immense figures have been published in America and in this country about the Soviet air forces—25,000 military aircraft produced yearly was one figure. The Minister of Defence said yesterday that the Russian forces—he was speaking of their total military forces—are backed by 19,000 military aircraft, including jet aircraft of the latest design, both bombers and fighters, but on the western front, which is the matter which I have most in point at the moment, in fighter and bomber aircraft, how many have they got in full commission?

Even if we took it as only 4,000, how many have we, the Americans, and the western allies, got on the continent to sustain our armies of perhaps 12 divisions as against 80 or 90? Here again, even if we were in secret session I would not ask the Government to state the exact figure, but could they say we have a half, a third, a quarter, a fifth, a sixth, or a seventh of what we know we have to face?

No doubt we may hope to have superiority in quality of machines and pilots, but this is by no means certain. We have been told that a large proportion of the Russian aircraft are of the highest quality. They have made great improvements in jet aircraft, and we so lightly心edly furnished them with specimen engines a few years ago. If the Russian armies reached or approached the coast of France and held the airfields, I fear they could outnumber us in the air by a far larger number of machines than Hitler ever had. Anything the Government choose to say on the fighter forces available for the defence of London and our vital feeding seaports which would reassure the House would give the deepest satisfaction.

SALE OF JET AIRCRAFT.

But there is another aspect of the air defence of Britain even more grave and intense. Two years ago the Government agreed that the Americans should establish a bombing base in East Anglia from which they could use the atom bomb upon the Russian cities and key points. The Americans have other bases but this is one of the most important. We did not, and we do not, criticize the Government for taking this very serious step, for which in any case they had the large Socialist majority of the last Parliament at their disposal. All this has been in the newspapers for a long time. I would not have asked the Government even in secret session for the exact numbers of the American offensive forces for using the atomic bomb on Russia which are located in this Island. However, the Prime

show. It is remarkable, considering all this, how quickly we were denied the confidence of the United States after the war was over, and how we have never been able, in five years, with all our own gathered knowledge, to make the atom bomb ourselves. I asked in 1948 what would happen when the Russians had a store of atomic bombs and said the western nations should formulate their just demands while they had the atomic power and before Russia got it too.

No attention was paid to this. I fully realize the difficulties and the dangers of such a policy—that it did not rest entirely with us—but now things have definitely worsened. It is painful in every respect to be told, as we were officially told some months ago, that the Russians have been able to gain the secret of the atom bomb through Communist traitors in the American and also notably in the British services.

BEST CHANCE OF PREVENTING WAR.

But between having the secret and making any large number of bombs, there is undoubtedly a considerable interval. It is this interval which we must not waste. (Cheers.) We must endeavour to make up the melancholy leeway in military preparations which are pressing us to-day, and we must never abandon the hope that a peaceful settlement may be reached with the Soviet Government if a resolute effort is made, not upon our present weakness, but upon American atomic strength. This is the policy which gives the best chance of preventing a fearful war and of securing our survival should it break upon us. I do not expect that any of the allies know how many atomic bombs the Soviet Government have yet been able to make but—and I am only stating my personal opinion—I do not think they have made many yet or that their rate of production is at present rapid. Earlier in this session, two months ago, I said:

If the Americans have a stockpile of, say, 1,000 bombs and the Russians have only 30, and we set those 30, it would not be pleasant.

I was surprised that this crude remark did not affect opinion but then, only two months ago, there was a different atmosphere. All these matters had seemed quite wrongly to be outside the range of ordinary politics and daily life. Now they dominate the minds of all thinking and patriotic men and will increasingly do so as the months pass by.

It was stated at a Lobby conference called by the Home Office, according to the *Daily Telegraph*, that each atom bomb costs as much as a battleship. This is ludicrous nonsense. It may be that the first two or three would cost that, or more, if they were saddled with the whole expense of research and production up to date, but, once in production, the costs would certainly be less than one-twentieth or one-fiftieth of a modern battleship. Nevertheless, I adhere to my feeling—although I am quite ready to be instructed by those who have the advantage of official information—that so far very few have been produced and the extraordinary efforts that the Soviet Government is making to obtain even small quantities of uranium seem to justify a hopeful view. If this is happily true there is no doubt that the United States possesses a superiority so vast that any major act of Russian aggression is still subject to an effective and even perhaps decisive deterrent. It is for this reason that I have ventured on several occasions to express the opinion that a third world war is not imminent and I cherish the hope that it may still be averted.

MISTAKE IN PROPAGANDA.

I noticed in the debate on civil defence that there was a considerable tendency, not confined to any one part of the House, to minimize the effects of the atomic bomb. The Government have issued a booklet on this subject. No doubt it is right, nearly always, to take a robust and cheerful view, but I expect that this booklet, from what I have learned of its contents, will be more cheering to the Russians than to us because the atomic bomb is the only weapon on land, sea, and in the air in which the Americans, that is to say our allies, could possibly have an overwhelming superiority during the next two or three years. I should have thought, therefore, that it was a mistake in propaganda to weaken or discount a deterrent among those who are already so much stronger in every other sphere except this. We shall need the whole weight of this deterrent to gain us the time which remains, while this great advantage of ours endures.

We are, of course, dependent on the United States both for the supply of the bomb, and largely for the means of using it. Without it we are more defenceless than we have ever been. I find this a terrible thought. In 1940 I had good hopes that we should win the battle in the air, even at heavy odds, and that the Royal

NO SECRET SESSION GOVERNMENT MAJORITY OF ONE

The Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill passed through Committee.

On the order for the third reading,

MR. CHURCHILL (Woodford, C.), continuing his declared endeavour to secure that the resumed debate on defence should be in secret session, rose in his place, and, looking around at the persons in the various public galleries, said:—Mr. Speaker, I spy strangers. (Loud Opposition cheers.)

The result of the division was:—

Noes	296
Ayes	295

Government majority: 1

The figures were received with loud Opposition cheers and Ministerial counter cheers.

MR. CHURCHILL ON SOVIET STRENGTH.

BIG TANK FORMATIONS

The debate on defence was then resumed by MR. CHURCHILL, who said:—It has been decided by the House that our debate must be in public—(Ministerial cheers)—and I shall confine myself to stating facts which are certainly well known to the Soviet Government and to the General Staffs of Europe and the United States. I shall ask the Government a number of questions, but, as they have been

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